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7.1  Introduction 
In many countries, capital markets provide the major source of external fi- 
nancing for firms. In these countries, a financial accounting system has devel- 
oped over time that seeks to fulfill a regulatory objective of providing relevant 
and reliable information about the financial position and profitability of  the 
firm  to  shareholders and  lenders. In  other countries, capital markets have 
played a less crucial role, and the information objectives have been less well 
defined. 
Tax authorities have also developed reporting requirements that facilitate the 
accurate calculation of  tax liabilities. In the United States and several other 
countries the two sets of information are largely distinct (“two-book” coun- 
tries); one book is designed to accurately describe the firm’s tax liability, and 
one is designed to convey to the market essential information for assessing the 
firm’s profitability.’ The existence of  two  sets of  books reflects the different 
objectives of financial-market participants and policymakers. The most effec- 
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1. As discussed in section 7.2, the designation “two-book‘’ does not imply that all measures 
differ for accounting and tax purposes. Rather, it refers to the regulatory environment that separates 
accounting and tax reporting. 
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tive rules to enforce tax regulations  may  not  be the same rules that  induce 
efficient transmission of information about the firm to the market. 
Many countries do not have a two-book system similar to that in the United 
States. Instead, these countries typically require firms to match their tax and 
accounting statements for each taxable entity. Under tax conformity (in “one- 
book” countries), firms may only take tax deductions if they have been rec- 
ognized  in reports  to shareholders  either before  or concurrent  with tax  re- 
cognition. Firms operating in these countries face a fundamentally  different 
environment in which signals of the firm’s profitability to external investors are 
intermeshed, perhaps inextricably, with the firm’s tax accounts.’ 
For the most part, tax research has ignored differences in  accounting re- 
gimes. In  this paper, we carefully document some of  the institutional details 
of  one-book and two-book countries, with the goal of identifying significant 
differences between the two regimes. We then explore the extent to which ac- 
counting regimes might be expected to affect the interaction between tax pol- 
icy and real beha~ior.~ 
If information flows less smoothly to the market in one-book countries, one 
would expect several consequences.  First, firms may have relative difficulty 
raising funds in equity markets if they cannot provide reliable information to 
shareholders. As a result, one-book firms may have relatively more capital sup- 
plied by and closer relationships with banks, which could, in principle, provide 
the careful monitoring  necessary  in a world  without particularly  useful  ac- 
counting information. As we discuss below, there is already some limited evi- 
dence  suggesting  that  this  is  the  case  (see,  e.g.,  Hoshi,  Kashyap,  and 
Scharfstein 1991).4 Second, while firms in the United States may freely act to 
minimize their tax burdens by availing themselves of all legal tax benefits, as 
we discuss below, firms in one-book countries may have to equate the benefit 
of tax minimization strategies, which effectively reduce their reported taxable 
income, with  two potential  costs:  lower reported  income may  inadvertently 
signal that the firm’s prospects have worsened and may, in addition, reduce the 
pool of funds that can be legally distributed to shareholders. These tradeoffs 
may make firm investment in this environment much less sensitive to tax policy 
than is the case in the United States. 
These arguments suggest that multinationals based in one-book countries 
2. Firms everywhere must keep a careful account of their assets in order to operate efficiently. 
This set of “operating books” could also be quite useful for information purposes (e.g., during a 
friendly takeover or to banks with insider holdings). Technically, this means that  we should be 
referring to “two-book’ and “three-book’’  countries. Since the operating books are not constrained 
by  law (and thus their value is difficult to assess), and are generally unavailable for applied re- 
search, we will continue with our terminology. 
3. It is not the purpose of this paper to model the equilibrium between the accounting system 
and the institutional environment or to explain the evolution of a country’s system. 
4.  The direction of causality could well be the opposite. The demand for external equity capital 
may be low where close relationships with banks are allowed. In this case, low demand for infor- 
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may be at a disadvantage when investing in countries with generous tax incen- 
tives. A necessary but not sufficient condition for this to occur is for firms in 
one-book countries to demonstrate less responsiveness to domestic tax incen- 
tives. By induction, if one-book firms do not utilize domestic tax benefits, they 
also may  not utilize those earned abroad. Using panel data drawn from the 
Global Vantage database, we explore this question below and show that invest- 
ment is in some cases less sensitive to tax policy in one-book countries. 
The paper proceeds as follows: In section 7.2, we provide a description of 
the major differences in accounting systems across countries. In section 7.3, 
we develop a structural model in order to formalize and explore the implication 
that in countries with one-book accounting standards domestic firm-level in- 
vestment may be less sensitive to tax law changes. In section 7.4, we introduce 
a multicountq firm-level panel data set that, combined with panels of tax in- 
formation, allows us to estimate the model derived in section 7.3. Section 7.5 
summarizes our results. Three appendices provide additional detail on the ac- 
counting system in each country of the sample, the data set, and the tax param- 
eters. 
7.2  The Different Accounting Regimes 
There are certain generic attributes that apply in several countries that illus- 
trate the key differences between national accounting regimes. We  first focus 
on two countries, the United States and Germany, and then discuss in appendix 
A how other countries vary from the two benchmarks. It is crucial to under- 
stand from the outset that these regimes are not static and that national account- 
ing systems are moving toward a more global equilibrium as global capital 
markets evolve. Hence, we relate some historical detail to develop an under- 
standing of the dynamics of the environment over the period we consider. 
7.2.1  The United States: A "Two-Book" Case 
U.S. public companies are required to provide periodic published financial 
statements  in  conformity  with  generally  accepted  accounting  principles 
(GAAP). While the requirement for publicly available annual financial state- 
ments derives from specific laws, the precise features of GAAP are determined 
by  private-sector organizations, primarily the Financial Accounting Standard 
Board (FASB). The FASB operates under the watchful eye of  a regulatory 
agency, the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), that occasionally pre- 
scribes its own rules or interpretations that become part of  GAAP. There is 
an established hierarchy whereby the SEC and FASB rules largely determine 
U.S. GAAP. 
The clearly stated objective of  U.S. GAAP is to provide information to in- 
vestors and creditors to enable them to predict the future cash flows and profit- 
ability of an enterprise. The FASB has tried to ensure that it is not perceived 
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fiscal objectives of tax regulators. In fact, reporting requirements for tax pur- 
poses have evolved independently over time.5 The tax base used for calculating 
income taxes is determined by the tax code, and differences arise in the valua- 
tion criteria and measurement rules applied for tax and financial reporting pur- 
poses. For example, tax regulations allow a specific accelerated schedule of 
depreciation for equipment. U.S. GAAP requires companies to allocate the 
costs of  equipment so as to reflect how  it is consumed in the production of 
revenue. While companies choose among a set of alternatives, often choosing 
an accelerated method, it is most unlikely that this method would yield the 
same depreciation schedule used for tax purposes, as the latter is determined 
by  efforts to influence a firm's capital investment practices. 
The spirit of financial reporting practice is to reduce the information asym- 
metries between managers and owners by  reflecting the economic activity of 
the entity. This information can then we used to evaluate how well managers 
have utilized their resources, allowing shareholders and creditors to determine 
their investment strategies based on expected profitability. By maintaining a 
dual valuation and measurement system the potentially conflicting objectives 
of information revelation and fiscal policy can each be achieved independently. 
Of  course, accurate forecasts of  tax  liabilities are crucial for evaluating a 
firm's prospects. To aid in reconciliation of the two sets of books, U.S. GAAP 
requires a detailed explanation of material differences between tax payable on 
the basis of tax law  and a hypothetical tax expense based on the product of 
accounting income and the federal tax code. 
The separation of the two sets of books is the rule, but there are exceptions 
that help shed light on the forces that may govern behavior in one-book coun- 
tries. The case of  accounting for inventory provides an  interesting example. 
Under  U.S. tax regulations, companies may  adopt a last-in-first-out (LIFO) 
policy to account for inventory. This practice will usually lead to higher ex- 
penses, and hence lower taxable income when prices of inputs rise. At the time 
LIFO was first allowed, the tax regulations required that companies adopting 
LIFO for tax purposes also use the method for financial reporting purposes. 
Thus, LIFO is the primary example of  tax conformity in the United States. 
Initially, companies were not permitted to provide information about the value 
of  inventory accounted for using other methods, such as the first-in-first-out 
(FIFO) method. However, this was perceived by managers and shareholders as 
creating biases in the information system. As a result, many managers chose 
not to adopt LIFO practices, even though such adoption would have signifi- 
cantly reduced tax liabilities. Eventually, firms lobbied for rules that allow for 
supplementary disclosures of the more current (and, presumably, more infor- 
mative) measures of  inventory. While extensive research has been performed 
5. The alternative minimum tax (AMT) was an attempt to partially bridge the gap. To  ensure 
that GAAP did not become tax driven, the FASB lobbied against making taxable income or AMT 
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analyzing why many companies choose not to adopt LIFO, it seems reasonable 
to assume that, given rational investors and managers, the benefits from infor- 
mation based on unbiased measures outweighed the costs of forgone potential 
tax savings in this episode.6 
To summarize, U.S.  GAAP utilizes a broad proprietary concept that assumes 
shareholders and to an extent creditors are the focal point for resource alloca- 
tion decisions and the corporate entity is the vehicle for the efficient use of the 
allocated resources. It is also widely presumed that profit maximization is the 
goal of  both  managers and  shareholders, so that by  providing information 
about the use of  resources, investors can ensure their efficient allocation. 
Tax-reporting rules have evolved independently over time. In the one recent 
case where conformity of  the books was required by  law, some U.S. firms, 
surprisingly, chose not to use LIFO, even though this decision increased tax 
liabilities. 
7.2.2  Germany: A “One-Book” Case 
The U.S. perspective contrasts to the traditional German approach to ac- 
counting. The primary source of  German accounting regulation has been the 
Commercial Code, Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB), which was revised in 1985 to 
incorporate the Fourth and Seventh Directives of the European Community.’ 
In addition, there are several other laws that influence accounting practice, in- 
cluding the income tax law. 
We  shall describe the relationship between tax and accounting regulation in 
some detail, but initially it is useful to understand that the accounting laws 
have, from the beginning, been oriented toward a determination of  what in- 
come is available for distribution to stakeholders (shareholders, tax authorities, 
and employees) with the clear objective of protecting creditors and “ensuring” 
the maintenance of the entity as an operating unit. German law and the institu- 
tional framework are oriented toward protecting and developing the capital 
base of each entity. The accounting system reflects a similar objective and uti- 
lizes an entity concept as the core framework. This creates fundamental differ- 
ences relative to the proprietary approach adopted in the United States, where 
the purpose of reporting rules is less conservative. 
The emphasis on capital maintenance and minimization of distributable in- 
come is manifested in the legally dictated dominance of  the application of 
prudence for measuring assets and liabilities. Asset accruals are governed by 
6.  Recent examples of research in this area include Jennings, Mest, and Thompson (1992). 
7. The Fourth Directive defined the format of financial statements, defined basic concepts and 
valuation principles, and required the accounts to be evaluated in terms of providing a “true and 
fair” view of the firm’s financial position. However, within each of these categories, flexibility 
was permitted to reflect different jurisdictional preferences. The Seventh Directive focused on the 
requirement to present fully consolidated financial statements for groups of companies forming a 
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the “imparity principle” (lmparitatsprinzip),  requiring recognition of both re- 
alized and unrealized losses (e.g., on foreign exchange contracts) but disal- 
lowing recognition of  any unrealized gains.8 This introduces a conservative 
bias in the reported net asset measure. As in the United States, German income 
is essentially equal to the change in cum dividend net assets. However, German 
taxable income is measured directly from the tax balance sheets, whereas U.S. 
taxable income is derived from revenue and expense flows. 
Traditionally, Germany has also required a close conformity between tax 
and financial reporting measures. As explained, the legally based accounting 
rules are formulated on the basis of  determining what income can be distrib- 
uted. Ordelheide and Pfaff (1993) argue that the tax law takes a similar per- 
spective as it is based on taxing the earnings that can be distributed by  an 
enterprise while maintaining the productive capacity of  the income source. 
Hence, in Germany there has been a symmetry in the objectives of tax and 
financial reporting that does not exist in the United States. This leads to the 
observation that both German tax and financial reporting regulations focus on 
long-run maintenance of  the capital base, and therefore of the source of  in- 
come, even if this may not lead to profit maximization in a neoclassical sense. 
The imposition of prudence has a noticeable effect on the pattern of German 
returns. German companies have lower average reported profitability than their 
U.S.  counterparts, but there is also less cross-sectional variation in the reported 
profitability (see, e.g., Harris, Lang, and Moller 1993). 
The similarity between tax and financial reporting systems is not only the 
result of confluent objectives. The German tax computation is based on bal- 
ance sheets prepared in accordance with GAAP. This is known as the “authori- 
tative principle” (Mussgeblichkeitsprinzip),  and the direction of  causality is 
from accounting to tax. While this is the initial direction of the relation, there is 
a second effect that goes in the opposite direction and is known as the “reverse 
authoritative principle” (umgekehrte Mussgeblichkeitsprinzip). The latter gen- 
erally allows companies to use the tax rules to determine certain accounting 
policies when no specific policy is prescribed by the accounting law. The tax 
law requires companies to take the expense for accounting purposes in order 
to have it deducted for tax purposes, much like LIFO in the United States, and 
hence the two sets of books are virtually identi~al.~ 
The discussion so far describes how the German laws facilitate a lower tax 
base to restrict distributable and taxable income. However, once the base is 
determined the tax law creates an incentive to distribute the income by  the 
differential rates applied to distributed and retained current income (see appen- 
dix C). 
Another significant difference between the German and U.S. systems is the 
8. In contrast, US.  firms must recognize unrealized gains and losses in certain cases, such as 
9. This explains the ”one-book” nomenclature. 
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treatment of  consolidation. German income tax is largely applied at the level 
of the legal entity, with investments in subsidiaries measured at acquisition cost 
or lower. The HGB of  1985 required companies to present fully consolidated 
financial statements.I0  To some extent, the HGB of 1985 permits companies to 
apply different accounting standards in their consolidated statements than they 
use for the legal entity tax-conforming financial statements. Consequently, to 
the extent that German companies perceive a cost created by  tax conformity 
requirements they can choose a two-book approach if  they have to present 
group accounts. While this may appear to create a system similar to that found 
in the United States, this is unlikely to be the case for several reasons. First, 
the information and accounting systems in place generate data for each of the 
individual, legal  entity tax-conforming statements. The consolidated state- 
ments are compiled from these, and to the extent that the legal entity state- 
ments are uninformative because of their basis in tax law, this would also apply 
to the consolidated statements. The basic reporting practice is still governed 
by tax regulations. Second, users of financial statement, have, presumably, de- 
veloped an understanding of how to interpret the individual legal entity reports 
or have  created mechanisms to reduce information asymmetries. Thus, the 
marginal benefit of  a change in accounting practice is probably less than it 
would be if  the information set consisted solely of  the financial statements. 
Nevertheless, since both types of firms appear in our sample, in the empirical 
tests of the model we consider controlling for these factors by differentiating 
between companies that applied full consolidation and those that do not. 
If reports are perceived to be somewhat uninformative, alternative sources 
may emerge if the benefits of additional information are perceived to be high 
by  market participants. In Germany, financial analysts have developed a pro- 
cess to yield an adjusted earnings measure that is meant to be more useful for 
making cross-sectional and time-series comparisons. Some firms voluntarily 
supply the information, and if it is not supplied, analysts attempt to impute it. 
The measure, known as the DVFNSG earnings, does not adjust specifically 
for tax-oriented items; however, to the extent that a tax-based valuation mea- 
sure makes earnings less comparable it will be adjusted in the calculation." 
In sum, the one-book basis of accounting in Germany arises from a common 
objective of  capital  maintenance for  tax  and  reporting. This  objective is 
weighted more heavily than profit maximization, which is a dominant objective 
in the United States. While the reasons for the German system having evolved 
in this manner are outside the scope of  this paper, they are clearly related to 
the sources of capital available to firms, the history and institutional framework 
of the country, including the use of bearer shares, the lack of large amounts of 
institutional capital outside of banks, the acceptance of weaker antitrust regula- 
10. After 1990, all German companies satisfied this requirement, but before then only a subset 
did. 
11.  Busse  von  Colbe et  al. (1991) provide  a  useful discussion  of  the  DVFNSG earnings 
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tion, and the lack of regulation of insider trading. However, increasing demand 
for international sources of capital is shifting the institutional structure toward 
a two-book system. 
7.2.3  Summary of Accounting Differences 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 summarize the basic features of the U.S. and German 
accounting regimes, respectively. In the United  States, the tax and financial 
reports are governed by separate bodies. The subsidiaries'  information is con- 
solidated by the parent into two separate statements, one prepared for the IRS 
and one for the SEC. 
In Germany, the organization is more complicated. All reporting is based on 
the HBG, which governs unconsolidated  tax returns filed by  the parent  and 
each subsidiary. These returns are filed with the Ministry of Finance. To  some 
extent the tax rules feed back into the reporting practice via the umgekehrte 
Massgeblichkeitsprinzip.  Finally, parents prepare consolidated statements that 
are mostly based on the same accounting rules that govern the tax returns. 
7.3  Accounting Regimes and Firm Investment 
In this section, we develop a structural model to help explore a precise impli- 
cation of our descriptive analysis: the responsiveness of domestic investment 
to changes in the domestic tax code may also depend on the accounting regime. 
The reluctance of domestic investors to utilize tax incentives will drive a wedge 
between the costs of capital faced by investors from different countries. In our 
view, this investigation is a crucial precursor to the analysis of  the effects of 
accounting regimes on foreign capital flows. 
To derive testable implications from a model with varying information reve- 
lation by firms, we begin  with the standard Euler equation model for invest- 
ment.12 The firm maximizes  the present  discounted  value  of  after-tax divi- 
dends. The firm's  production function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas  with 
constant returns to scale: 
where Y is output, K is the capital stock, N is labor input, i is the firm index, 
and t is the time index. Investment in capital, I, which depreciates at a constant 
geometric rate, 6, is assumed to be subject to quadratic adjustment costs: 
In addition, we assume that in countries relying on only one set of books, 
the market participants employ an independent monitor, which verifies that the 
12. Oliner, Rudebusch, and Sichel (1 993) provide an excellent review of  these models 189  Accounting Standards and Investment 
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firm is actually investing at the level of  I. One could think of  these as costs 
incurred by  the shareholder in order to gain an accurate description of  firm 
activity.I3  These costs result from the fact that high deductions lower the firm’s 
tax base, and the market requires that this type of reduction be distinguishable 
from a reduction due to lower profitability. In a two-book country, higher tax 
benefits are endnoted in the financial statement, and so should be desirable 
from the perspective of  the firm. In a one-book country, this may not be the 
13. The  DVFALSG earnings report is an example of  the type of  monitoring that we  are at- 
tempting to model. Kanniainen and Sodersten (1994)  use such monitoring costs to develop a model 
in which a firm  chooses not to maximize its tax debt, because higher tax debt would lead to higher 
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Fig. 7.2  Schematic of German accounting regime 
case. Tax  benefits that are large relative to earnings may require significant 
additional information c0~ts.l~  Specifically, we assume that the firm faces an 
additional information revelation cost function; 
(3) 
where I?,,! describes the tax benefit of investing, which, in the United States, is 
defined as 
14. In a one-book country with few investment incentives, these costs should be inconsequen- 
tial. But in all the countries in our sample, investment incentives exist (especially for depreciation) 
and are, in general, generous (see appendix C). 191  Accounting Standards and Investment 
where k is the investment tax credit, p is the real required rate of return, T is 
the marginal corporate tax rate, and Dep(a) is the depreciation allowance per- 
mitted an asset of age a discounted at a nominal rate that includes the inflation 
rate  expected, re.  This expression may  be  defined  slightly differently de- 
pending on the tax code.l5 We  use the detailed information on each country’s 
tax code (contained in appendix C)  to calculate the above expression. This 
function has the desirable properties that the marginal cost of  revelation in- 
creases with the tax benefits and that these costs have a lower bound of zero if 
tax benefits are also zero. The assumption that these costs are quadratic is 
somewhat restrictive, but simplifies our estimation problem significantly.  I6 
The firm is assumed to be a price-taker in the prices of  output, p, capital 
goods, g, and labor, w.  To simplify the exposition, the price of output is normal- 
ized to equal unity, so that the purchase price of capital and labor are relative 
prices and the relative price of capital goods to output is simply g. 
The firm chooses investment to maximize the expected present discounted 
value of after-tax dividends 
where E, is the expectations operator conditional on information available at 
time t and p,,, is the period-j discount factor for firm i.  The derivational details 
and resulting Euler equations that incorporate equity and debt issuance are 
omitted here for expositional simplicity. Their addition generates few addi- 
tional insights into the issues on which we have focused. 
To  derive the Euler equation for investment, set the derivatives of the La- 
grangian that results from equations (5) through (7) to zero at time t: 
15. E.g., a slight redefinition would be necessary for those countries in our sample that have 
16. The monitoring adjustment cost is not a function of the depreciation rate because we believe 
different rules for basis adjustment. 
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Equation (8) is the first-order condition that equates the marginal cost of ac- 
quiring capital and the shadow value, Xi,r, of an increase in the capital stock at 
time f.  Equation (9) indicates that it is optimal to set the return in period f + 1 
of a marginal unit of capital equal to the cost of  capital in period r + 1. To 
derive the equation we estimate, we use equation (8), and equation (8) rolled 
forward one period, to substitute out for the unobservables, Xi,, and 
Substituting in the specific functional forms for C, R,  and F: 
After rearranging terms, simplifying, imposing rational expectations to elimi- 
nate the expectations operator, and generalizing the expectations error to ac- 
count for the panel nature of  our data, we obtain 
The first error term on the right-hand side of equation (15),  u,, is a firm- 
specific measurement error in the levels of  the left-hand-side variables. This 
error is assumed to be approximately constant over time. The last two error 
terms, v,+, and ei,r+,,  are expectational errors, where E,(V,+~  + e,,,,,)  = 0. The 
Euler equation we estimate follows directly from this equation. Equation (15) 
is first differenced to remove the first error term and estimated by the general- 
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accommodates conditional heteroskedasticity of  unknown form in the error 
term ei,r+l,  and the time dummies estimate v,,~  in each period.I7 
While the model is somewhat stylized, it does provide a structural test for 
the  importance  of  accounting  regimes  for  domestic  investment  behavior. 
Strictly speaking, for firms in two-book countries, a,  should be equal to zero, 
and for firms operating in one-book countries, a1  should be greater than zero. 
To  the extent that firms in one-book countries are able to avoid information 
restrictions, a1  may be zero even in one-book countries. 
7.4  Empirical Analysis 
In this section we present estimates of  our model. For estimation, we use 
the Global Vantage data set and panels of tax information, described in detail 
in appendices B and C, to estimate the first difference of  equation (15) for 
one-book and two-book countries. As we indicated above, in many countries 
mechanisms have emerged that attempt to provide a second set of books for 
some firms in one-book countries. In addition to the most basic split between 
one- and two-book countries, we also explore the extent to which consolidation 
helps firms in one-book countries avoid signaling problems. To briefly fore- 
shadow the results, we will show that we can identify large differences in in- 
vestment behavior between one- and two-book firms when we only include in 
our sample firms that can clearly be classified as one or two book. Simply 
classifying by  country,  which  ignores  additional  information  about  firm- 
specific accounting practices, leads to inconclusive results. 
The discussion of accounting regimes raises serious measurement issues 
that will affect any empirical studies that use the Global Vantage database. 
When constructing the model, we have specific variables for output, taxes, and 
capital. The extent to which the variables recorded in our database conform to 
these definitions varies considerably across and within countries. Nowhere is 
the measure as precise as we would like. These measurement problems are 
serious in every country in our sample, but it is important to note that one 
should not conclude from our accounting discussion that measurement error, 
in the classical regression sense, is higher in one-book countries. The theme of 
our discussion is that the information reported by firms in one-book countries 
is not as comprehensive and relevant for assessing future profitability as it is 
in two-book countries. The principal advantage of the second set of books is 
their ability to provide a signal of  current earnings and hence profitability to 
external capital markets, perhaps better than tax accounts could. The degree to 
which specific variables are measured well or poorly is highly idiosyncratic, 
however. For example, the tax books may well be the best tool for measuring 
17. The moving average error introduced by  first-differencing is treated by  using instruments 
dated before t -  1 and by a Bartlett spectral density kernel to correct the GMM weighting matrix. 194  Jason G. Cummins, Trevor S. Harris, and Kevin A. Hassett 
the impact of a change in the tax law on a specific firm. These effects may 
appear larger in one-book countries if the variables reported in Global Vantage 
are based on tax conformity. 
To help minimize the problems of measurement error, we pay careful atten- 
tion to the source of each data item. Within our one-book countries, data for 
different firms are based on different levels of consolidation. To aid in a more 
precise mapping  of  accounting effects and econometric estimation, Global 
Vantage identifies the firm's  accounting  standard (see appendix B). The tax 
rules in  many countries apply at the level of the legal entity. In  the Global 
Vantage database, recorded data are frequently drawn from consolidated re- 
ports, which may have little correlation with the variables that go into the tax 
calculation. Moreover, these consolidated reports also may include foreign in- 
vestments, which in many countries fall outside of the sphere of domestic tax 
policy. Global Vantage identifies whether the annual financial statements repre- 
sent the legal entity report, a holding company report (rarely used), a domestic 
consolidation  report, or full consolidation report.  Over our sample period, 
consolidation becomes increasingly prevalent, and we are able to explore the 
impact on our results of restricting our sample to firms whose data are drawn 
from consolidated and unconsolidated reports. In general, consolidation causes 
the most problems for our empirical analysis when it incorporates substantial 
foreign assets that are not covered by domestic tax laws. When this occurs, the 
measure of investment includes investment not necessarily covered by domes- 
tic law, which can bias tax coefficients severely.I9 
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 contain the tax variables that we use in our empirical 
work. Details of variable construction are contained in appendix B. Table 7.3 
provides the means and standard deviations for the some of the variables we 
use. In addition, the number of observations available for estimation is reported 
in each cell. 
The structural model developed in section 7.3 has many antecedents. Spe- 
cifically, if a1  is set equal to zero, so that the  adjustment function (eq. [3]) 
has no effect, equation (15) reduces to a standard investment Euler equation 
(see, e.g., Abel  1980; Cummins and Hubbard, chap. 5 in this volume; Him- 
melberg  1990; Hubbard and Kashyap 1992). This standard investment equa- 
tion has been estimated on many different data sets under a wide variety of 
different assumptions. To provide a link to this literature and to introduce the 
model in this paper, the estimates of the standard investment Euler equation 
are provided in table 7.4. 
For one-book countries, a",  the investment adjustment  cost parameter, is 
estimated to be  1.21 with standard error 0.499. For two-book countries, the 
estimate is 2.32 with standard error 0.771. The test of the overidentifying re- 
18. Hams et al. (1993) provide a discussion of this issue for German companies. 
19. For any single firm-year there is only one of the reports within the database. Hence, while 
it would be useful to discriminate between the legal entity (one-book) and consolidated (possible 
two-book) reports for a given firm-year, this is not possible with Global Vantage. 195  Accounting Standards and Investment 
Table 7.1  Marginal Corporate Income Tax Rates 
Country  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 
Australia"  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .49  .49  .39  .39  .39  .39  .39 
Belgiumh  .48  .45  .45  .45  .45  .45  .43  .43  .43  .4  1  .39  .39 
Canada',d  ,483  .483  .472  .46  ,483  ,483  ,464  ,391  ,391  ,391  ,391  .391 
Denmark  .40  .40  .40  .40  SO  .50  .50  .50  .50  .40  .38  .38 
France'  SO  .50  .50  SO  SO  .45  .45  .42  .39  .37  .34  .34 
Germany'  .56  .56  .56  .56  .56  .56  .56  .56  .56  .50  .5 19  .5 I9 
Irelandd  .45  SO  SO  .50  .50  .50  .50  .47  .43  .43  .40  .40 
Italy'  ,363  ,413  .413  ,464  ,464  ,464  ,464  .464  ,464  ,464  ,478  .552 
Japanc.&  .42  .42  .42  .433  ,433  .433  .42  .42  .40  ,375  ,384  ,384 
Netherlands  .48  .48  .48  .43  .43  .42  .42  .42  .35  .35  .35  .35 
New Zealand  .45  .45  .45  .45  .45  .48  .48  .28  .33  .33  .33  .33 
Norwayh  ,508  .508  ,508  ,508  ,508  .508  ,508  ,508  ,508  ,508  ,508  .28 
Sweden'  .58  .58  .58  .52  .52  .52  .52  .52  .52  .40  .30  .30 
Switzerland'  .098  ,098  ,098  ,098  ,098  .098  ,098  ,098  .098  ,098  ,098  ,098 
United Kingdom  .52  .52  .52  .45  .40  .35  .35  .35  .35  .35  .33  .33 
United States'  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .46  .40  .34  .34  .34  .34  .34 
"Undistributed profits were taxed at the rate of .50 until an imputation system came into operation July 
1987. 
bExcess  profits surtax at the rate of .04 applied until 1982. 
'Additional corporate income tax levied by state and/or municipal government which is rebated or deduct- 
ible at the federal level. 
dCorporate income tax is levied at a lower rate on manufacturing firms. 
'Split-rate  system, which applied a higher tax rate to distributed profits, was in effect from 1989 until 
1992. 
'Distributed profits taxed at a lower rate of .36. 
@Distributed  profits were taxed at a .I0 lower rate until 1988. In  1989, distributed profits were taxed at a 
.05 lower rate. The split-rate system was permanently abolished in 1990. 
hAdditional corporate income taxes were levied at the municipal level and for a "tax equalization fund' 
resulting in a combined  rate of  .23 which was not deductible from the federal rate of  ,278. Effective 
1992, the federal corporate income tax was abolished, the municipal rate was lowered to .11, and the tax 
equalization fund rate was increased to .17. 
'Additional corporate income tax levied at the municipal level, which was deductible at the federal level, 
was abolished in 1985. 
'Federal, cantonal, and municipal corporate income taxes, which are typically partially deductible against 
one another, are levied at graduated rates based on the proportion of taxable profits to equity capital. Top 
federal rate reported. 
Spain  .33  .33  .35  .35  .35  .35  .35  .35  .35  .35  .35  .35 
strictions rejects the model, at standard confidence levels, for one-book coun- 
tries and does not reject it for two-book countries. Both parameter estimates 
are within the range reported in previous research using U.S. firm-level panel 
data (see, most recently, Hubbard, Kashyap, and Whited 1995). 
To  the extent that these results conform with previous estimates, we  feel 
confident that the data will allow extension to incorporate the features of the 
model derived in section 7.3. However, we advise caution in interpreting the 
estimates of the standard model literally, and especially in interpreting the test 196  Jason G. Cummins, Trevor S. Harris, and Kevin A. Hassett 
Table 7.2  Investment Incentives 
Country  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 
Australia”  .I8 
Be  1  g  1  u m  .05 
Canada‘  .07 
Denmarkd  0 
France*  .I0 
Germany  0 
Ireland  0 
Italy  0 
Japan  0 
Netherlands“  .I2 
New Zealand  0 
Norway  0 
Spain‘  .I5 
Swedenh  .I0 
Switzerland  0 
United Kingdom  0 




























































































































































































Note; All 17 countries have investment incentives for specific regions or industries, for certain types of 
business fixed investment, or for research and development which are not reported. 
%vestment  incentive was a deduction. 
bInvestment  incentive was a deduction. Before 1982, the incentive was an investment reserve. 
‘Investment incentive was an investment tax credit (ITC). In Canada, regional and some asset ITCs were 
retained at reduced rates after 1988. 
dA  limited investment reserve is available. See footnote g below for a description. 
‘Investment incentive was an ITC (called “WIR’). In  1984, the various WR  rates were combined into 
one uniform rate; before 1984 the rate reported is that for most fixed assets. Beginning in 1990, an invest- 
ment deduction is available at degressive rates ranging from .I8 to .02 for relatively small scale invest- 
ment; no deduction is allowed after the cutoff total is reached. 
qnvestment incentive is an ITC. In 1985, a statutory rate for fixed assets was instituted; before 1985 the 
rate reported is that for the typical investment grant. 
%westment incentive was an investment allowance. Until 1990, an investment reserve program was also 
available. It allowed companies to set aside and deduct, at their own discretion, up to 50 percent of their 
pretax profits for future investments in a countercyclical fund. The benefit of the fund was that it could be 
used for immediate depreciation of new assets acquired. 
of the overidentifying restrictions. While it is usual in this literature to “accept” 
a model if the test statistic is less than the critical value, the test is only of the 
orthogonality of  the instruments and the error terms. This may pose a more 
serious problem than usual in this data set since we have argued throughout 
that there are a wide number of measurement error problems in the variables 
that we use for instruments and in the estimation. We have attempted to allevi- 
ate these potential biases in constructing the variables  and in estimating the 
model, but we, necessarily, remain agnostic about the degree to which these 
efforts are successful.20 
20. The range of point estimates and their standard errors was relatively tight, but we found that 
wild swings in the x’  statistic could result from seemingly innocuous changes in the instrument set. 197  Accounting Standards and Investment 
Table 7.3  Sample Statistics 
\ale\,  ca\h llow,  debt, 
Numher ot Firm\ (1991  )  Country  1, 
K,  I  K,  I  K,  I  a\\et\, 
Australia 



































































Note:  Standard deviations are in parentheses below the means. 
Table 7.5 presents estimates of a.  and a,  in equation (15). The investment 
adjustment cost parameter, ao,  in both samples is positive and significant. For 
one-book countries, it is estimated to be 0.739 with standard error 0.351. For 
two-book countries, it is estimated to be 0.998 with standard error 0.265. Both 
these estimates are within the range of adjustment costs-although  somewhat 
lower than-estimated  using the Euler equation formulation. An estimate of 
0.998 implies that an extra dollar of investment will lead to about 0.05 dollars 
of  adjustment costs.21 
21. Interpretation of the size of  the adjustment costs depends on the proximity to the steady 
state. Near the steady state, most of  investment is replacement investment, which does not incur 198  Jason G. Cummins, Trevor S. Harris, and Kevin A. Hassett 
Table 7.4  Standard Euler Equation Estimates 
Regime 
Investment Adjustment Cost  Test of Overidentifying 
Parameter  Restrictions 











~______  ~  ~~~ 
Notes: The standard Euler equation sets a,  equal to zero in eq. (15). 
One-book countries are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Spain, Swe- 
den, and  Switzerland.  Two-book countries  are Australia,  Canada, Ireland,  Netherlands,  New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
Standard errors, in parentheses, are computed from a heteroskedastic-consistent  matrix. Sig- 
nificance levels of Hansen's test of overidentifying restrictions are in parentheses beneath the sta- 
tistic. 
The one-book sample contains 1,890 firms. The two-book sample contains 4,420 firms. The in- 
strument set used for estimation includes: ([la,  ~  2,  (NK),  ~  3, (I/flZ,  ~  >,  (I/K)*,  ~  ?,  (cash BowlK),  ~  2. 
(cash AowlK),  ~  J,  (saleslK),  ?,  (saleslK),  ~,  (depreciatiodK),  ~  >,  (dividends/operating income),  2, 
(debvassets),  >,  (interestlfl,.  >,  (taxeslK),  ~  >,  (k + TZ),  ~  >,  and (k + 72):- 2. 
Table 7.5  Euler Equation Estimates 
lnvestment Adjustment  Accounting Adjustment  Test of Overidentifying 
Cost Parameter  Cost Parameter  Restrictions 
Regime  On  X:, 
One-book countries  ,739  -  ,696  45.33 
no-book countries  ,998  -4.84  77.09 
(.351)  (.489)  (9.05 x 
(.265)  (1.36)  (1.48 x lo-") 
Notes: One-book countries are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, and Switzerland. Two-book countries are Australia, Canada, Ireland, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
Standard errors, in parentheses, are computed from a heteroskedastic-consistent matrix. Sig- 
nificance levels of  Hansen's test of overidentifying restrictions are in parentheses beneath the sta- 
tistic. 
The sample sizes and instrument set are the same as reported in table 7.4 
To  provide additional insight into these estimates it is useful to compare 
them to those reported in closed-form q-model formulations. These estimates 
are substantially smaller than ones implied by closed-form q-formulations esti- 
any adjustment costs in the model. For the first few dollars over and above depreciation, marginal 
adjustment costs are low, by  the convexity assumption. Far away from the steady state, marginal 
adjustment costs can be very high, even given our parameter estimates. For the comparison re- 
ported in the text, we applied the sample means of the investment-to-capital ratio and depreciation 
rate (0.21 and 0.16, respectively) in order to gauge the relative adjustment costs. 199  Accounting Standards and Investment 
mated with either U.S. firm-level panel data (see, e.g., Gilchrist and Himmelb- 
erg 1991) or with U.K. firm-level panel data (see, e.g., Blundell et al. 1992).22 
The small estimates reported in the q-studies implied unreasonably large ad- 
justment costs, implying that the scale of the adjustment cost is substantially 
larger than that of  the purchase cost of  the investment good. The estimates 
above indicate significantly lower adjustment costs. 
The accounting adjustment cost parameter a,  in table 7.5 is negative and 
insignificant in the one-book sample, and negative, substantially larger, and 
significant in the two-book sample. For one-book countries, the estimate is 
-0.696  with  standard error 0.489. For two-book countries, the estimate is 
-4.84  with standard error 1.36. However, we  should not overemphasize the 
precision of these results: the tests of overidentifying restrictions are rejected 
in both models (with tiny implied p-values). Both estimates have the incorrect 
sign. An extra dollar of investment leads to 0.03 dollars more in total adjust- 
ment costs in the one-book sample, and 0.003 dollars less in adjustment costs 
in the two-book sample, given the sample means of the relevant parameters 
(see n. 21). 
There are a variety of reasons why this result may not be spurious, in spite 
of the fact that it confounds the intuition outlined in the description of  the 
countries’ institutional features and the assumptions in deriving the model. 
However, we believe the crude one-bookltwo-book distinction may not be what 
the model captures. In section 7.2, we outlined how firms, even in one-book 
countries, can avoid restrictions placed on them by  the tax authority and how 
they attempt to mitigate the information costs associated with their home coun- 
tries’ particular institutional features. Perhaps the estimation results were not 
illuminating because we incorrectly grouped firms; one-bookltwo-book may 
not be the exact partitioning between firms facing low information revelation 
costs and those facing high ones. 
There are a number of different subsamples that might provide evidence on 
this point. In table 7.6, we consider two polar opposites that seem to confirm 
the analysis of why one-book/two-book is too coarse a distinction. Table 7.6 
presents estimates for two subsamples. The first is one-book firms that report 
only in accordance with domestic accounting standards and are not fully con- 
solidated (i.e., report as legal entities). The second is one-book firms that report 
in accordance with U.S. GAAP (nearly all of whom are fully consolidated). 
The groupings incorporate firms from many different countries.23 
In the first subsample, both adjustment cost parameters are positive and sig- 
nificant. In the second, similar to the result in two-book countries reported in 
table 7.3, the investment adjustment cost parameter is positive and significant, 
22. See Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard  (1994).  who  use the  q-model but  estimate much 
23. The largest  number of  firms in the first subsample is from Germany, and in the  second 
smaller adjustment costs, in line with those reported above. 
from Japan. Table 7.6  Euler Equation Estimates (one-book country subsamples) 
Subsample 
Investment Adjustment Cost  Accounting Adjustment Cost  Test of  Overidentifying 
Restrictions  Parameter  Parameter 
Q"  X:, 
Domestic accounting standards and domestic consolidation 












(1.12 x 10-7) 
Notes: One-book countries are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland 
parentheses beneath the statistic. 
Standard errors, in parentheses, are computed from a heteroskedastic-consistent matrix. Significance levels of  Hansen's test of overidentifying restrictions are in 
The first subsample contains 790 firms. The second subsample contains 381 firms. The instrument set used for estimation is the same as reported in table 7.4. 201  Accounting Standards and Investment 
while the accounting adjustment cost parameter is negative and not significant. 
In the first subsample, a,,  is estimated to be 0.520 with standard error 0.219 
and 01, is estimated to be 3.64 with standard error 1.02. These estimates imply 
that an extra dollar of investment leads to a total of 0.07 dollars of adjustment 
costs, with 0.05 dollars of that attributable to the accounting adjustment costs, 
given the sample means of the relevant parameters. In addition, the model can- 
not be rejected at standard confidence levels. 
In the second subsample, a,,  is estimated to be 1.91 with standard error 0.683 
and a,  is estimated to be -7.55  with standard error 4.52. The test of the over- 
identifying restrictions is rejected conclusively. These estimates accord closely 
with those reported for two-book firms in table 7.3, providing some evidence 
that firms that report according to U.S. GAAP face adjustment costs similar to 
those faced in two-book countries. The total of  the two adjustment costs is 
roughly zero. The investment adjustment cost parameter is plausible, the ac- 
counting adjustment parameter is negative, and the test of  the orthogonality 
conditions is decisive. 
The results in table 7.6 seem to confirm the hypothesis that additional costs 
can be associated with the taking of tax benefits in one-book countries and that 
this cost is largely avoided by a portion of  firms even in one-book countries. 
Monitoring costs appear to be important, and their size depends critically on 
identifying which firms are likely to be subject to them within one-book coun- 
tries. The size of  the monitoring costs is at the high end of  estimates for the 
investment adjustment cost parameters in  the Euler equation literature and 
dominate investment adjustment costs in our model. Firms in one-book coun- 
tries that prepare accounts according to U.S. GAAP appear to be qualitatively 
similar to firms in two-book countries. 
7.5  Conclusions 
We describe two different accounting regimes that govern reporting practice 
in most developed countries. We  provide a structural model that formalizes a 
testable implication of our discussion: that domestic firm-level investment in 
one-book countries may face additional adjustment costs and, as a result, be 
less sensitive to tax law changes than is investment in two-book countries. In 
our discussion of  the accounting regimes, we indicate that over time mecha- 
nisms have  emerged in one-book countries that allow some firms to provide 
information in alternative ways.  Our econometric estimates suggest that ac- 
counting regime differences play an important role in describing the domestic 
investment pattern across countries. In particular, firms that operate under a 
“pure” one-book system behave as if they face an additional cost when utilizing 
investment incentives. The firms appearing most constrained are those that do 
not file consolidated statements according to U.S. GAAP. Firms in one-book 
countries filing according to U.S. GAAP behave much more like U.S. firms. 
Since most multinationals face some type of consolidation requirement, our 202  Jason G. Cummins, Trevor S. Harris, and Kevin A. Hassett 
evidence suggests that the playing field for multinationals is probably roughly 
even with respect to ability to claim tax benefits. Information costs may have 
driven a wedge in historical user costs of  capital, but these forces are likely 
diminishing  today;  many  one-book  countries  are gradually  moving  toward 
two-book systems, as exemplified by the Fourth and Seventh Directives of the 
European Community. 
Our results, taken at face value, suggest one should not study international 
taxation in isolation. The institutional environment in which multinationals op- 
erate may be crucial to their decision making. We have studied one particular 
aspect of this interaction, but there are many others. In work in progress, we 
are exploring whether international capital flows have become more efficient 
over time in response to the gradual easing of  information asymmetries im- 
posed by accounting regimes. 
Appendix A 
Summaries of Country-Specific  Accounting Practices 
Canada 
Canada has a two-book system with financial reporting accounting standards 
based on a proprietary approach prescribed by the Canadian Institute of Char- 
tered Accountants. There is a close similarity to U.S. GAAP that is evidenced 
by the SEC allowing mutual recognition of Canadian accounting standards for 
Canadian firms listing in the United States. However, Canadian GAAP does 
not provide the detailed reconciliation of tax expense for tax and financial re- 
porting purposes that we find in the United States. Canadian taxes are applied 
on the consolidated results but on a territorial basis. 
United Kingdom and Ireland 
The United Kingdom has had a two-book system since the corporation tax 
was first introduced. The basic financial reporting requirements  derive from 
the Companies Act  first issued  in the mid-nineteenth  century and amended 
many  times since then. The Companies Acts of  1985 and  1989 are the key 
regulatory items currently in force. The Companies Acts require audited fi- 
nancial statements to present a “true and fair view” in conformity with GAAP. 
GAAP has been outlined by various private bodies in a similar manner to that 
found in the United States. The most recent standard-setting body is the Ac- 
counting  Standards Board, which is structured on a basis  very close to the 
FASB . 
Two distinctions between the United  Kingdom  and the United  States are 203  Accounting Standards and Investment 
worth noting. First, there is no SEC equivalent to provide a tight regulatory 
link. Second, the existing codification of U.K. GAAP is much less detailed and 
less comprehensive than in the United States. There are also distinctions be- 
tween U.K. and U.S. GAAP, some of which are relevant to the issues consid- 
ered in this paper. The first distinction is that U.K. managers may revalue their 
assets periodi~ally.~~  These asset revaluations are discretionary, and the gains 
and losses are not taxable, nor are they reported in current reported income. 
Thus, gross investment in assets measured from Global Vantage using tangible 
fixed assets (see appendix B) is measured with error as in some cases it in- 
cludes revaluation adjustments (see, e.g., Easton, Eddey, and Harris 1993).  The 
second distinction is that U.K. tax law does not permit the use of LIFO for 
inventory valuation. Thus, while LIFO is permitted by  U.K. GAAP, it is not 
used. Third, the accounting treatment for temporary differences in the timing 
of tax and accounting revenues or expenses is usually different in the United 
Kingdom, relative to the United States. In the United Kingdom, companies 
have  the option to accrue only for those differences which are expected to 
be realized (“crystallize”) within a five-year period. In the United States, all 
temporary differences must be accounted for. The alternative treatments may 
cause a difference in reported debt, equity, and income measures. 
The U.K. financial reporting system follows the proprietary approach, with 
equity being a major source of capital. Taxable income is determined by  tax 
rules which are not bound by U.K. GAAP, so it is a two-book case. 
Australia and New Zealand 
The roots of accounting and tax practice for these countries lie in the United 
Kingdom, with the United States playing a greater role in more recent times. 
Both countries adopt a proprietary approach to their financial reporting prac- 
tices and have established capital markets as the major source of capital for 
large firms. As in the United Kingdom, discretionary revaluations of assets are 
permitted and occur. Easton et al. (1993) find that these revaluations are value 
relevant but also demonstrate the potential errors in extracting this level of 
information from the aggregated data in Global Vantage, as we noted in the 
discussion of  the U.K. practice. Hence, we  note that our gross investment 
proxy is knowingly measured with error, in part because of the idiosyncrasies 
in the accounting systems. 
Netherlands 
The Netherlands provides another example of a two-book system. Histori- 
cally, the Netherlands had an essentially laissez-faire system with companies 
24. Asset revaluations in different forms occur in many countries in our sample. See appendix 
C for whether and to what extent countries allow revaluations. 204  Jason G. Cummins, Trrvor S. Harris, and Kevin A. Hassett 
applying generally acceptable accounting standards. While various laws have 
been enacted since the first Accounting Act, effective since 1971, for most of 
the time listed companies have usually followed accounting principles oriented 
toward representing the economic substance of transactions. 
The tax law has its own specific requirements but requires taxable income 
to be based on sound business practice. So there is an implicit, but no direct 
link to financial reporting requirements. 
The accounting law was amended to incorporate the Fourth Directive of the 
European Community with an effective date of January 1984 and the Seventh 
Directive of the European Community effective from January 1990. However, 
both of  these amendments were more in form than substance as listed Dutch 
companies were already complying with most of the standards. 
As in the case of Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, Dutch 
companies may revalue their assets or apply a full current cost system. In such 
cases, as the tax system continues to be based on historical costs, the deprecia- 
tion charge may be higher for accounting purposes for certain assets. 
In  general, in the Netherlands we expect the differences between tax and 
accounting income to be less than for several other two-book systems. 
Japan 
The accounting system originates in the German Commercial Code (HGB), 
which was "imported" at the time of the Meiji Restoration, and was revised on 
the basis of  changes in Germany's Commercial Code through 1938 (Ballon 
and Tomita 1988). Following World War 11, revisions of the Commercial Code 
and the first Securities Exchange Law  (1948) were based on U.S. practices. 
Hence, the Japanese system is a mix of our two benchmark systems. The focus 
of both tax and financial reporting has been the legal entity, as we find in Ger- 
many. Currently, tax is still applied on the legal entity results rather than the 
consolidated group accounts. 
An  example which helps to illustrate the legal versus consolidated entity 
aspect of taxation is the often misunderstood issue of the tax deductibility of 
goodwill. The tax  law  allows goodwill to be  amortized over five years and 
deducted in the calculation of taxable income. But this goodwill is generally 
not the goodwill found in consolidated financial statements which arises from 
investments in the equity of  subsidiaries. For such investments, there is no 
goodwill separately reported in the legal entity statements. The taxable good- 
will that arises is from an asset purchase made at a premium to market value. 
On  consolidation the two goodwill measures are accounted for in the same 
manner, but in the legal entity reports they are treated differently and hence 
are not taxed in the same manner. 
To better understand the relationship between tax and financial reporting in 
Japan, it is useful to be aware of  some of  the regulatory influences and the 
evolution and perceived relevance of  consolidated reporting. The foundation 205  Accounting Standards and Investment 
of  financial and tax reporting is the Commercial Code which applies to all 
legal entities and is under the jurisdiction of  the Ministry of  Justice. On the 
other hand, the Securities Exchange Law applies to listed companies, and is 
the source of  regulations for consolidated reports. The Securities Exchange 
Law is administered by the Ministry of Finance, which is the defucto source 
of GAAP for listed companies despite the existence of  advisory committees 
like the Business Accounting Deliberation Council. Measurement rules used 
to obtain taxable net income are largely based on GAAP for financial reporting 
purposes, at least as applied to the legal entity level. Thus, expenses such as 
depreciation and cost of  goods sold conform in the tax and accounting in- 
come measures. 
Differences arise in the two sets of books as a result of  certain tax-exempt 
or disallowed items or when a company chooses to take expenses in excess of 
those allowed for tax purposes. A common example is in the accrual for em- 
ployee postemployment benefits. The tax law allows a deduction equal to 40 
percent of the amount payable at the fiscal year end. Many companies accrue 
between 40 and 100 percent of this amount. As we might expect from rational 
tax minimization strategies, we know of no instances of companies that accrue 
less than 40 percent. There are other examples where the tax-based reserve is 
usually in excess of  what would be required under an information-oriented 
system. A simple example is the reserve for bad debts which is based on a 
percentage  of  total  receivables plus  allowances for  specific doubtful cus- 
tomers. 
There is a growing body of evidence that the reports which result from this 
hybrid system interact in idiosyncratic ways with market indicators. First, there 
is both anecdotal (see Viner 1988) and empirical evidence that the primary 
accounting information source in Japan is the legal entity rather than consoli- 
dated report (see, e.g., Darrough and Harris 1991; Hall, Hamao, and Hams 
1993). Second, French and Poterba (1991) and Hall et al. (1993) show that 
equity prices are not related to accounting data in any manner that is consistent 
with what is found in the United States. This finding is consistent with what 
we might expect in a one-book country. 
As we argued earlier, if the books are unreliable signals of the market perfor- 
mance of  firms, alternative information sources may  well emerge which at- 
tempt to fill the gap. As is the case in Germany, such alternative conduits have 
also emerged in Japan. Japanese companies began to access capital in the inter- 
national markets in the 1960s. Many of these companies (e.g., SONY) sought 
capital in the United States but only had legal entity financial statements. Con- 
sequently, they “voluntarily” prepared consolidated statements in conformity 
with U.S. GAAP to comply with U.S. regulations. In  1983, Japan required 
fully consolidated financial statements for the first time for all listed compa- 
nies. Those companies already preparing their consolidated statements under 
U.S. GAAP were allowed to use these for Japanese purposes too. Hence, to 
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In addition, managers systematically provide forecasts of operating profits and 
sales. Darrough and Harris (1991) shows that these forecasts have information 
content, particularly at the legal entity level. 
In  sum, Japan has a one-book system applying to the majority of corpora- 
tions. However, both via application of  U.S. GAAP for certain companies’ 
consolidated statements, and via supplementary information, investors receive 
additional information for valuation purposes. 
France and Belgium 
Traditionally, French companies have followed a one-book system, and this 
persists for legal entities. The French have a long tradition of  a codified ac- 
counting system. There is a legally defined chart of  accounts (from the Plan 
Comptable G6nCral) which is followed for both financial reporting and taxa- 
tion purposes, at least at the legal entity level. 
Requirements for additional information oriented toward investors first oc- 
curred in 1967 with the creation of a stock exchange regulatory authority, the 
Commission des Operations de Bourse (COB), which encouraged companies 
to reveal more investor-oriented information. As consolidated accounts were 
urged by  COB but had no legal basis, several large companies adopted their 
own approaches, with several choosing US.  GAAP or International Account- 
ing Standards (IAS). France adopted the EC’s  Seventh Directive, which re- 
quired consolidated accounts for listed companies, and from 1986, companies 
were allowed not to apply French GAAP at the consolidated level. Hence, we 
find that there is a mix of accounting approaches applied for the French compa- 
nies in our sample. 
An  interesting example of  how French groups take a flexible approach to 
their group accounts is in the treatment of premia on acquisitions of other com- 
panies. Since the 1980s this “goodwill” has frequently been capitalized and 
labeled “market share” with no amortization generally applied. There is no tax 
consequence to this treatment. 
The tax regulations use the legal entity reports in a manner similar to what 
we  have  described in other one-book countries. However, at least since the 
mid-1980s many French companies have deviated from the valuation rules ap- 
plied for tax purposes, at least for their consolidated accounts. 
Scandinavia 
We  describe Sweden as representative of the Scandinavian countries in our 
sample, which include Denmark and Norway. Tax law in Sweden has allowed a 
series of tax-free reserves which historically must be reflected in the published 
financial statements. These reserves have included an inventory reserve, invest- 
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been relatively high, this has been compensated for by  a lower base. Recent 
tax reforms have eliminated many of the tax-free reserves (see appendix C).25 
Scandinavian systems have been influenced by the German system and have 
a one-book approach. Nevertheless, to facilitate some separation of  the tax- 
free reserve data, the annual adjustments have been reflected as a separate part 
of the income statement and the cumulative amounts are reported as a nondis- 
tributable reserve in the balance sheet. Hence, while the one-book model ap- 
plies,  the  information related  to  specific tax-oriented adjustments can  be 
largely differentiated. 
Italy 
Italy has a one-book system with roots in a Napoleonic Civil Code. The 
Italian system is perceived to be strongly tax driven, which may have led to the 
fact that it was unable to pass legislation to incorporate the Fourth and Seventh 
Directives of the European Community until the 1990s. The new directives are 
irrelevant for our sample of companies. 
However, similar to France, Italy created a regulatory body to oversee the 
stock exchange and listed companies. This body, known as CONSOB (Com- 
missions Nazionale per la Societe la Borsa), required listed companies to apply 
IAS as no domestic standards oriented toward investor information existed. 
Prior to  the recently  approved amendments, IAS  allowed several options. 
Hence, it is likely that the financial reports even under IAS will closely mirror 
the legal entity statements that are based on the tax conformity principle. 
Spain 
The Spanish system was also based on the French system, but  until the 
1980s the system was almost entirely tax driven. Spain incorporated the Fourth 
and Seventh Directives in 1989 and 1990, so most companies will not meet 
these new reporting requirements during our sample period. 
Switzerland 
Historically, the only legal obligation for Swiss companies has been to pre- 
pare legal entity balance sheets and income statements. While many large com- 
panies have  provided additional information, historically there has been no 
common approach by  these companies. In the last few years there has been a 
trend by  Swiss companies to adopt IAS, although not always in a uniform 
manner. 
25. Denmark has a narrower investment reserve, and Norway none at all (see appendix C). In 
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The tax system cannot be described in a concise manner as there is no single 
federal tax rate and the federal taxes need not even be the most significant (see 
appendix C).  There are canton, municipal, and sometimes church taxes applied 
to varying degrees. Furthermore, the tax rates are often based on average in- 
come, so taxes may be applicable to income in years after the income is earned. 
Appendix B 
Data Description 
The data set we use in an 11-year (1982-92) unbalanced panel of firms for 17 
countries from the Global Vantage industrial database.26  This database contains 
information on approximately 6,650 companies from 31 countries. Data for 
most companies are available since 1982. Comprehensive balance sheet and 
income statement data are provided. Definitions are standardized to insure in- 
tracompany data consistency between different accounting periods and inter- 
company data consistency within and across countries. However, Global Van- 
tage  does  not  adjust  data  for  accounting differences. Instead, it  provides 
extensive additional information on relevant accounting standards, data defini- 
tions, and available firm-specific disclosures to enable the user to make what- 
ever adjustments are necessary. OECD member countries with more than 20 
firms reporting data are chosen for analysis. Unlike the Compustat database, 
Global Vantage has relatively few firm entrants and exist, making the data set 
nearly balanced. 
The variables used are defined as follows. To facilitate replication and exten- 
sion of our empirical results and to aid researchers in data construction on this 
relatively unfamiliar data set, we provide the data item numbers in parentheses 
after each variable. Gross investment is the sum of the change in the net stock 
of tangible fixed assets (data item 76) and depreciation (data item 1  l).*’A  more 
precise estimate of depreciation can be obtained (data item 12), but we choose 
the one above since most firms do not separately report the more precise figure. 
The definition of economic depreciation used is the same as used in previous 
research with the Compustat database (see, e.g., Cummins et al. 1994). The 
investment variable is divided by the value of its own beginning-of-period cap- 
ital stock. Output is defined as net saleshrnover (data item 1) and is also di- 
26. See table 7.5 for a list of all the countries. 
27. Defining gross investment as the change in the gross stock of tangible fixed assets (data item 
77) is not feasible since that data item is frequently not reported by firms, or was not required to 
be reported by  firms (eg,  German firms did not report the gross stock of fixed assets until the 
HGB of  1985). There is no data item in Global Vantage comparable to the capital expenditures 
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vided by  the value of  its own beginning-of-period capital stock. The Euler 
equation model we derived has a parsimonious specification so that the above 
variables are the only ones we need construct from Global Vantage. 
In addition to those variables above we construct several others to use in the 
instrument set for econometric estimation. Operating income is defined exactly 
as such (data item 14). Net income is defined as income before extraordinary 
items (data item 32). Economists usually define cash flow as the sum of  net 
income and depreciation (defined above). This definition is, at best, a coarse 
measure. The accounting literature stresses that better measures are available. 
We  experiment with an  alternative definition of  cash flow derived from this 
literature. Alternative cash flow is defined as the sum of net income, deprecia- 
tion, deferred taxes (data item 180), transfers to provisions (data item 182), 
gain (loss) on sale of fixed assets (data item 181), transfers to (from) reserves 
(data item 22), and the change in current liabilities (data item 104) minus the 
change in inventory (data item 66) and the change in accounts receivable (data 
item 63). The efficacy of this alternative measure was unclear in our empirical 
work, perhaps because the usual definition of cash flow is only another mea- 
sure of income (whereas the alternative better measures free cash flow) or be- 
cause the alternative definition is available less frequently or subject to more 
serious measurement error. Total income tax is defined exactly as such (data 
item 23). These variables are also divided by their beginning-of-period capital 
stocks. The dividend payout rate is defined as the ratio of common dividends 
(data item 36) to operating income (defined above). Alternative definitions of 
the payout ratio have no qualitative affect on the empirical results. We  chose 
the above definition because it limited the number of  negative observations. 
Total debt is defined as the sum of short-term debt (data item 94) and long-term 
debt (data item 106).  The debt-to-asset ratio is defined as total debt divided by 
the sum of the equity value of the firm and total debt. The equity value of the 
firm is complicated to calculate in Global Vantage. There is no single shares 
outstanding variable to match with one stock market price variable. Instead, a 
separate database (called the issues file) contains market-related data items, 
which include multiple issues with multiple prices for firms in several coun- 
tries (reflecting the differences across countries in capital markets.) The equity 
value of the firm is defined in the standard manner (end-of-year stock price 
multiplied by stock outstanding) when one issue exists.28  When more than one 
issue exists, the value of each is calculated in the standard manner and all the 
issue values are summed. The firm’s average interest rate is defined as the ratio 
of interest expense (data item 15) to total debt. All variables are deflated by the 
country’s GDP deflator. 
Firm-specific depreciation rates are constructed using the method in Cum- 
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mins et al. (1995). Past studies using foreign firm-level data have relied on the 
one-digit SIC code depreciation  rates constructed  from Hulten  and Wykoff 
(198 1) and capital stock weightsz9  We feel that the Euler equation model re- 
quires the more precise firm-specific depreciation rate and that, while the as- 
sumption of homogeneous  capital stocks may  be appropriate for some very 
large countries, it is inadequate for our sample of  17 countries. 
The present value of tax savings from depreciation allowances is constructed 
from those tax parameters following Salinger and Summers (1983). The dis- 
count rate, p, is defined as  1/[1  + (1 -  T)  i - re],  where i  is the nominal 
interest rate, calculated as firm’s average interest rate. Alternatively, fixing p at 
values between 0.90 and 0.99 did not qualitatively affect our empirical results. 
Finally, GDP deflators and investment price deflators (i.e., the price of capital 
goods) are from the OECD National Accounts tables. 
Global Vantage provides information particularly well suited to the model 
derived in this paper. There are data that potentially allow precise identification 
of the accounting information that we have hypothesized have real effects. We 
use two period descriptors  for additional identification  of the model in  our 
empirical work. Global Vantage provides a descriptor each period of the firm’s 
accounting standard. Most usefully, the data reflect a domestic standard if  a 
company omits a reference to a specific standard. When reported, the standards 
include:  domestic  standards;  domestic  standards  in  accordance  with  U.S. 
GAAP; domestic standards generally in accordance with OECD or Interna- 
tional Accounting  Standards  Committee  (IASC)  guidelines;  domestic  stan- 
dards for parents and domestic subsidiaries, native country or U.S. standards 
for overseas  subsidiaries; modified  U.S. standards  (Japanese companies’  fi- 
nancial statements translated into English); and U.S. standards. Another useful 
variable for our empirical analysis is the level of  consolidation. This period 
descriptor identifies whether a company’s financial statements represent con- 
solidated or unconsolidated information. Applicable categories identified are: 
only domestic subsidiaries are consolidated, fully consolidated  (parent com- 
pany and subsidiary), nonconsolidated holding company, and nonconsolidated 
holding company (parent company only). 
This appendix concludes with several caveats which may help guide applied 
researchers using Global Vantage in the future. Global Vantage offers a wealth 
of data that, in many ways, improve on more familiar firm-level panel data sets 
such as Compustat, Datastream, and Value-Line. There are, however, several 
negative features of the data set. The data set is split into four different files: 
industrial, financial services, issues, and currency.3o  The financial services file 
is superior to the industrial file in coverage and detail, reflecting the fact that 
29. See, e.g.,  Hayashi and Inoue (1991). 
30. The currency file contains exchange rates and cross-rate tables for designated currencies to 
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it was compiled after the industrial file. For example, equipment-and-structures 
capital stock data are provided in the financial services file but not in the indus- 
trial file. The biggest defect not easily overcome is that there is no way  to 
seamlessly move between the industrial or financial services file and the issues 
file because there is no common reference variable across files. The issues file 
is in itself difficult to use because of the multiple equity issues discussed above. 
Finally, perhaps the most subtle and potentially important feature of the data 
is that the variables are scaled within each country. For example, data are re- 
ported in billions of yen or lira and in thousands of pound sterling. In addition, 
the scaling is not  consistent within each country. For example, data for the 
British company BP are reported in millions of pound sterling, while most of 
the other companies in the U.K. sample are reported in thousands of  pound 
sterling. Failure to account for this reporting difference causes data to be incor- 
rect at three orders of magnitude with obvious consequences. 
The programs used for data extraction and construction and for estimation 
are available from the authors on request. 
Appendix C 
Tax Parameters 
This appendix details the tax parameters we use and relevant features of each 
country’s tax code. It is divided into four sections. The first provides the mar- 
ginal corporate income tax rate, 7.  The second provides the investment incen- 
tive (credit or deduction), k. These first two sections consist primarily of two 
tables, annotated, where appropriate, to reflect particularly important features 
of the country’s tax code. For additional detail we refer the interested reader to 
Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1994), which specifically addresses the ef- 
fects of tax reform on firm investment behavior. The next two sections provide 
depreciation and inventory valuation rules. Neither one of these sections of the 
tax code is easily or accurately summarized in a table, so we provide a detailed 
description for each country. Descriptions for the United States are omitted 
(see, e.g., Auerbach 1982, 1983; Hulten and Wykoff 1981; Salinger and Sum- 
mers 1983; Shoven and Bulow 1975). While depreciation and inventory valua- 
tion rules change much less frequently than corporate tax rates and tax credits, 
they do change over our sample period. We  will note particularly significant 
changes below, but again, we refer the interested reader to Cummins et al. 
(1995) for additional detail. 
There are four data sources for this appendix. The primary source for current 
tax law is the loose-leaf services of the International Bureau of Fiscal Docu- 
mentation (IBFD). The IBFD publishes guides to taxation in separate services 212  Jason G.  Cummins, Trevor S. Harris, and Kevin A. Hassett 
for Europe (Guide to European Taxation. Volume 2, The Taxation of Compa- 
nies in Europe), Asia and the Pacific (Taxes and Investment  in Asia and the 
Pac$c.  Part 2, Countries), and Canada (Taxes and Investment in  Canada).3‘ 
These services do not, in  general, contain the historical detail necessary to 
construct a time series of  changes in tax law. For that purpose, we  use the 
IBFD’s Tax News Service, which is a weekly periodical containing every sig- 
nificant tax law change. Some of the detail in the Tax News Service is contained 
in the IBFD’s Annual Report and in its European Tax Handbook. 
Two other sources are useful to validate and further illuminate the above 
sources. Neither provide sufficient detail, or, in some cases, accurate informa- 
tion, on relevant tax parameters. The OECD’s Taxing Projits in a Global Econ- 
omy: Domestic and International Issues, which tries to extend the King and 
Fullerton (  1984) methodology, provides an annex which contains summaries 
of  individual countries’ tax laws. The summaries contain broad detail on each 
country’s tax law but caution is advised. The data sources are undocumented, 
and several items were found to be incorrect. Coopers & Lybrand’s Interna- 
tional Tax Summaries and International Accounting  Summaries provide con- 
cise and  accurate yearly  descriptions of  countries’ tax  laws. The volumes 
sometimes lack sufficient detail on depreciation and inventory valuation rules 
and on the timing of tax changes. 
Marginal Corporate Tax Rates 
Table 7.1 reports the statutory marginal corporate income tax rates for the 
17 countries in our sample over  1981-92.  Close attention must be paid to 
the notes since no single rate completely summarizes the wide variation in the 
countries’ tax  systems. Two regularities are obvious. Rates vary widely and 
have steadily declined in nearly every country. 
Investment Incentives 
Table 7.2 reports the investment tax credits and deductions for the countries 
in our sample. Interestingly, only a few countries provide broad-based statutory 
investment incentives. However, all countries in our sample have  investment 
incentives for specific regions or industries, for certain types of business fixed 
investment, or for research and development which are not reported. These 
special incentives tend to be extremely complex, and in many cases, they can- 
not be summarized because they are essentially negotiated between the tax- 
payer and tax authority. 
31. In addition, the IBFD also publishes guides to taxation in Africa, the Middle East, China, 
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Depreciation 
Australia 
Depreciation of assets is calculated on the cost price and the useful life of 
the assets (which before 1991 was estimated by  the tax authority), which the 
taxpayer estimates based on the statutory definition. The tax authority contin- 
ues to publish recommended depreciation rates which the taxpayer may elect 
over estimating useful life. Plant and machinery may be depreciated on either 
a straight-line (SL) or declining-balance (DB) basis. In the absence of a formal 
election for the SL method, the DB method is used. Most assets acquired after 
1992 are depreciable by reference to a six-rate schedule, with useful lives rang- 
ing from three to more than thirty years and DB rates ranging from 10 to 60 
percent. SL rates are two-thirds of  DB rates. Assets may be depreciated at a 
lower rate at the option of  the taxpayer. Assets with an effective life of  less 
than three years or low-cost assets may be depreciated immediately. Structures 
may be depreciated at 2.5 percent per year if  construction commenced after 
September 1987,4 if construction commenced between August 1984 and Sep- 
tember  1987, and 2.5 if  construction commenced before August  1984. The 
period over which the depreciation may be claimed is 40 years for structures 
subject to the 2.5 percent rate and 25 years for structures subject to the 4 per- 
cent rate. 
Belgium 
Depreciation of  assets is calculated on the cost price and the useful life of 
the assets and is allowed as of the financial year in which they were acquired 
or produced and must be applied every year. The law allows only SL and DB 
methods. SL is the normal method. The depreciation periods and the corre- 
sponding rates are normally fixed by agreement between the taxpayer and the 
tax authority, although for certain assets the rates are set by administrative rul- 
ing (e.g., commercial buildings 3 percent; industrial buildings 5; machinery 
and equipment 10 or 30; and rolling stock 20). DB is optional, as is a combina- 
tion of  both methods-if  in  a certain year the amount of  depreciation com- 
puted by  applying DB is lower than that computed according to SL, then a 
company can switch to the latter method. Accelerated depreciation (AD) is 
available for certain assets based on administrative  ruling (e.g., ships and scien- 
tific equipment). 
Canada 
The capital cost allowance system groups depreciable assets into various 
classes (similar to the method used in the United States). Each class is depre- 
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ciable at a specific rate, generally on a DB basis. In the year of acquisition, 
only half the normal rate may be claimed on that asset. The depreciation allow- 
ances are elective, allowing the taxpayer to claim any desired amount (subject 
to the maximum). The following sets out some of the more common types of 
depreciable assets with the applicable DB rates: structures 4 percent, machin- 
ery and equipment 30, and autos and computers 30. Asset revaluation is not al- 
lowed. 
Denmark 
SL  depreciation for business structures is permitted. For most types of build- 
ings the depreciation rate is 6 percent of cost during the first 10 years, and 2 
percent thereafter (a lower rate is applied to service buildings of 4 and 1 per- 
cent, and a higher rate to building installations of 8 and 4 percent). Between 
1982 and 1990, the depreciable base was adjusted annually for inflation. For 
equipment, DB depreciation is allowed on a collective basis. The rate may be 
chosen by the taxpayer but may not exceed 30 percent in any year. Tax depreci- 
ation is not allowed for accounting purposes. 
France 
Depreciation  is normally  computed by the SL method. However, the law 
provides for other methods, namely, DB and AD. The SL method may be ap- 
plied without restriction. The rates are computed by dividing the expenditure 
by the estimated useful life of the asset as determined in accordance with ac- 
cepted business  practice. Taxpayers may opt for a varying depreciation  rate 
based on a different useful-life estimation but this will be accepted only if the 
difference is within 20 percent of  customary practice. The DB method is al- 
lowed on a more limited scale. It may not be applied to assets whose useful 
life is less than three years nor to many classes of assets. The rate is computed 
by multiplying the rate of SL depreciation by  1.5 if the useful life is three or 
four years, by 2 if the life is five or six years, and by 2.5 if the life exceeds six 
years. AD in the form of an initial deduction is available for certain assets (e.g., 
environmental  protection  equipment). Only limited asset revaluation  is per- 
mitted. 
Germany 
Systems of  depreciation  allowed by law are the SL, DB, and certain other 
methods (e.g., sum of the years’ digits). A switchover from DB to SL is permit- 
ted, but not vice versa. The rates of depreciation for buildings are set out in the 
law and for other assets in the official recommended tables (over 90 tables) 
that are issued by the various tax authorities. The taxpayer may deviate from 
them in individual cases on reasonable grounds. For business structures, the 
annual SL rate is 4 percent. The corresponding DB rates are, 10  percent for the 
first four years, 5 for the following three years, and 2.5  for the remaining  18 
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chinery, 20 for office equipment, 10 for office furniture, 20 for computers, and 
20 for motor vehicles. If the assets are depreciated according to DB the annual 
rate is limited to three times the SL rate with an allowable maximum of 30 
percent. AD is allowed for certain special assets (e.g., those in development 
areas or private hospitals) and if justified by  excessive wear and tear. Asset 
revaluation is not allowed. 
Ireland 
Depreciation is granted for structures and plant and equipment (which has a 
relatively wide meaning). The SL method is typically used. Rates for principal 
depreciable assets are 4 percent for industrial structures, 10 for commercial 
structures, 10 for machinery and equipment, 20 for motor vehicles (DB method 
used), and 100 for research expenditure. 
Italy 
Depreciation of  tangible assets is permitted on a SL basis. Depreciation is 
determined by  applying the coefficients established by  the tax authority, re- 
duced by  half for the first fiscal year. These coefficients are established for 
categories of assets based on normal wear and tear in various productive sec- 
tors (rates for structures vary from 3 to 7 percent, and for machinery and equip- 
ment from 20 to 25 percent). AD is also allowed. In addition to normal depreci- 
ation, the deductible amount may be increased by  200 percent in the year in 
which the asset is acquired and in one of the following two years. Moreover, 
normal depreciation may  always be increased in proportion to more intense 
use of  the asset (intensive depreciation). The amount of depreciation may be 
less than normal depreciation, and the difference may be spread over subse- 
quent fiscal years. Only limited asset revaluation is permitted. 
Japan 
The amount depreciable on assets per year is computed on the assumption 
that their salvage value is 10 percent of the acquisition cost. However, compa- 
nies may claim depreciation until the residual value of the asset reaches 5 per- 
cent (i,e., up to 95 percent of acquisition costs). The statutory useful lives of 
assets are prescribed by the tax authority. They range from 4 years (for motor 
vehicles) to 65 years (for office buildings). Special depreciation is available 
for assets subject to abnormal wear and tear and due to extraordinary circum- 
stances. AD is also available for designated assets and industries (e.g.,  environ- 
mental protection equipment and ships.) Initial-year depreciation rates range 
from 8 to 30 percent and further AD can follow. Asset revaluation is not al- 
lowed. 
Netherlands 
Depreciation of assets is compulsory whether the company is profitable or 
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All systems of depreciation are permitted provided that the system is in accor- 
dance with sound business practices  and that it is consistently  applied. This 
means that changes in the system will not be allowed when a change is made 
just for tax purposes. Depreciation is based on historic cost price, useful life, 
and the salvage value of the asset. No official guidelines for depreciation exist. 
In practice,  the rates  are agreed upon between  the taxpayer and the tax  au- 
thority. 
New Zealand 
A new depreciation regime became law in April 1993.  The pivotal difference 
between  the old and new regimes is that under the latter the taxpayer  has a 
statutory right to a deduction for depreciation.  Previous depreciation deduc- 
tions were at the tax authority's discretion. The taxpayer may choose SL or DB 
methods. The method may be changed from year to year. Depreciation  rates 
are calculated from a formula that accounts for acquisition cost, market value, 
and useful life. The tax authority provides a very extensive schedule of esti- 
mated useful lives (ranging from 4 to SO years), with applicable DB and SL 
rates. Application for special rates may be made in certain circumstances. Pre- 
viously, the tax authority mandated choice of SL or DB methods and deprecia- 
tion rates. 
Norway 
The DB method of  depreciation is mandatory. The 1992 tax reform has in- 
fluenced the system of depreciation by changing the division of business assets 
into a smaller number of classes and by generally reducing the maximum rates 
allowed. Depreciable assets are divided into eight classes (maximum rates fol- 
low in parentheses):  (1) office machines (30 percent), (2) goodwill (30), (3) 
motor vehicles (25), (4) equipment (20), (5) ships (20), (6) aircraft (20), (7) 
industrial  structures (3,  and (8) commercial structures (2). Assets in classes 
1-4  are written down on a collective basis; classes 5-8  are depreciated individ- 
ually. AD for ships, aircraft, and certain structures  has been abolished  as of 
1992. Assets with an estimated life of less than three years and low cost assets 
may be depreciated immediately. 
Spain 
Depreciation  is allowed on all tangible and intangible fixed assets on the 
basis of their normal  useful life. Depreciation  may be calculated  by the SL 
method. In certain cases (e.g., industrial machinery  and computers), the DB 
method is permitted.  Rates for depreciation  are contained in official tables. 
Examples of general maximum  SL rates follow (with the minimum rate fol- 
lowing in parentheses): Industrial structures 3 percent (2 percent), commercial 
structures  2  (1.33), machinery  8 (5.6), tools  20  (12.5), office  furniture 10 
(6.67), computers 25 (16.7), and motor vehicles  14 (9.1). Assets intensively 
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additional shift. Under the DB  method, the annual depreciation rate is in- 
creased by 50 percent (if the useful life is less than five years), or by  150 per- 
cent (if the useful life is eight years or more). The tax authorities can accept, 
at their discretion, special AD (or even free depreciation) for certain assets and 
industries. Asset revaluation is not permitted. 
Sweden 
Machinery and equipment are normally depreciated by the DB method. The 
maximum depreciation allowance is 30 percent of the aggregate book value of 
all assets at the beginning of the tax year, plus the cost of assets acquired, less 
the amount received for assets sold during the year. Should a SL depreciation 
of 20 percent per year on all assets result in a lower book value in any year, the 
annual depreciation may  be increased correspondingly. If  the taxpayer can 
prove that the real value of  machinery and equipment is lower than that re- 
sulting from the above-mentioned depreciation methods, the depreciation may 
be allowed in an amount resulting in the value. Assets with a useful life not 
exceeding three years and low-cost assets may be depreciated immediately. For 
buildings, only the SL method is permitted. In general, depreciation is based 
on cost and useful life. The rates vary between 1.5 and 5 percent per year as 
agreed by  the taxpayer and the tax authority. 
Switzerland 
The SL and DB methods are allowed, but depreciation must conform to 
usual business practice. Official guidelines for depreciation are published, but 
they are not obligatory. In practice, depreciation rates vary among the cantons. 
AD (up to 80 percent) is allowed in certain cantons. Asset revaluation is not 
permitted. 
United Kingdom 
Industrial structures are eligible for 4 percent annual depreciation on the SL 
method. There are no allowances for commercial structures. Plant and equip- 
ment (which has a relatively wide meaning) is eligible for 25 percent annual 
depreciation on the DB method. 
Inventory ValuationJJ 
Australia 
For valuation of stock, the tax authority accepts average cost (AC), standard 
cost (SC), specific identification (SI), and FIFO. LIFO and base-stock methods 
are not allowed. 
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Belgium 
The tax code does not contain special provisions for the valuation of stock. 
The tax authority therefore requires that the stock be valued at cost or market 
value, whichever is lower. As for methods, AC, SI, FIFO, and LIFO methods 
are accepted but the base-stock method is not. 
Canada 
Permissible inventory valuation methods include AC and FIFO. In some cir- 
cumstances, the tax authority will accept the SC method. The LIFO method is 
not accepted. 
Denmark 
acceptable but rarely used. 
The AC, SI, FIFO, and SC methods are considered appropriate; LIFO is 
France 
ally permitted except when used in consolidated financial statements. 
Germany 
methods; FIFO is not allowed unless it approximates actual physical flows. 
The FIFO and AC methods are usually used. The LIFO method is not gener- 
From the assessment year  1990, LIFO is allowed. AC  and  SI are typical 
Ireland 
FIFO, AC, or any similar method is allowed; LIFO is not acceptable. 
Italy 
if  the LIFO method is used. 
Any system of  inventory valuation is permitted provided it is not less than 
Japan 
For valuation of  stock, the tax authority accepts AC, SI, LIFO, and FIFO. 
The method should be applied consistently and not distort the computation of 
the income of a corporation. 
Netherlands 
Under the sound business practice principle, many systems of inventory val- 
uation are allowed (e.g., LIFO, FIFO, or base-stock methods). The system 
must be applied consistently. 
New Zealand 
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Norway 
The FIFO method must be used for inventory valuation. 
Spain 
Accepted methods for inventory valuation are AC (in practice, the generally 
applied method) and FIFO. The LIFO and base-stock methods are not accepted 
for tax purposes. 
Sweden 
Prior to 199  1, inventories were frequently camed at an amount lower than 
the maximum amount permitted by the lower of cost or market value, due to 
tax incentives. In determining inventory valuation, the FIFO method should 
be applied. 
Switzerland 
Acceptable inventory valuation methods include AC, SC, and FIFO. LIFO 
is not permitted. 
United Kingdom 
FIFO, AC, or any similar method is allowed. LIFO is not acceptable. 
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Comment  G.  Peter Wilson 
The Cummins, Harris, and Hassett paper differs from the typical offering in the 
international accounting literature because the authors test hypotheses using a 
rigorous model of economic behavior. This contrasts with the prevalent  ap- 
proach in the accounting literature, which is to use ordinary least squares to 
test for statistical relationships that are consistent with hypothesized behavior. 
I suspect the paper also differs from the usual offering in the economics litera- 
ture in that the authors’ hypotheses more fully exploit institutional aspects of 
international accounting. Thus, as we might expect from this research team, 
the paper significantly extends two literatures. 
The authors examine an important research question: Are firms’ investment 
decisions influenced by whether they are required to use essentially the same 
accounting for tax and financial reporting? In the United States, the accounting 
rules for recording many economic events differ significantly for tax and fi- 
nancial reporting because the authorities responsible for these rules recognize 
that their reporting objectives differ. The stated objective of financial reporting 
is to provide information that is useful for predicting future cash flows. In con- 
trast, the objectives of  tax reporting are subordinate to the broader social and 
economic  objectives of the tax  system, which include, among other things, 
raising revenue, redistributing  income, and promoting  certain kinds of eco- 
nomic activity. 
The authors refer to the United  States and other countries where there is 
little conformity between tax and financial reporting as “two-book” countries. 
They refer to countries where almost complete conformity  is mandated  for 
financial  and tax  accounting  as  “one-book”  countries.  Typically, one-book 
countries have congruent  objectives for financial and tax reporting.  For ex- 
G. Peter Wilson is  visiting associate professor of  management  at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology. 222  Jason G. Curnrnins, Trevor S. Harris, and Kevin A. Hassett 
ample, in Germany, the ultimate one-book country, the objectives of the tax 
and financial reporting systems are essentially the same-to  maintain capital. 
The authors proffer that firms in one-book countries are disadvantaged, rela- 
tive to their two-book counterparts, when they make tax-advantaged  invest- 
ments. The reason, they argue, is that the one-book firms must recognize the 
related accelerated depreciation deductions for both financial and tax purposes. 
In contrast, the two-book firms can use straight-line depreciation for financial 
reporting and, thus, report higher financial income. To  the extent that profit- 
ability has the same impact on the cost of capital in both regimes, firms in one- 
book countries could face a higher cost of capital to finance new projects. 
However, I question whether profitability is as important in the one-book 
regimes. For example, if the providers of German capital and the German tax 
authorities are both more interested in capital maintenance than in profitability, 
as the authors suggest, then why do the providers of capital care if  financial 
reporting  income is reduced to make investments that preserve capital? My 
concern here only makes the empirical question of whether the cost of capital 
is higher in one-book countries more interesting. 
The authors cleverly model this additional cost of capital as the cost a one- 
book firm incurs to signal that its reduction in income is due to prudent tax 
planning rather than to poor operating performance. As indicated in equation 
(3), the cost of this revelation signal, a,  which is treated as an additional ad- 
justment cost in the standard investment model used by Cummins and Hubbard 
(chap. 5 in this volume), depends nonlinearly on the size of the tax benefit per 
dollar of investment, the amount invested, and the capital in place at the start 
of the year. This is a keen modeling insight, and I believe that it is the only 
point where the analytic and econometric analysis differs substantively from 
the Cummins and Hubbard paper. Thus, many of the discussant’s comments 
about the Cummins and Hubbard paper are also appropriate here. 
The signaling cost, a,  is assumed to increase quadratically in the size of the 
tax benefits. On the one hand, this seems intuitive because we might expect 
firms with lower reported income to have to work harder to convince analysts 
that income is low because of good tax planning. On the other hand, if a one- 
book firm started using a second set of books (as some of the sample firms do), 
the cost of producing and distributing reports from these second books would 
not depend on the size of the tax break. 
In a related matter, as the authors acknowledge, the model is silent as to 
whether the signaling cost is incurred by  the firm or by  shareholders in the 
form of additional monitoring fees. Another option is that these costs are paid 
to shareholders in the form of risk premiums that could possibly be reduced 
by additional disclosure. Accounting academics would like to know how these 
costs, which are variable in the model, compare to the fixed costs of establish- 
ing two sets of books or setting up business as an external intermediary such 
as the DVFNSA. If firms or outside intermediaries cannot achieve the econo- 
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private information to the capital markets, then the result could be a higher 
cost of capital in the form of risk premiums. 
The results are mixed for the primary tests reported in table 7.5, which parti- 
tion the data into one- and two-book countries. For both samples, the signaling 
cost parameter, a,,  has the wrong sign and the model’s overidentifying restric- 
tions are rejected. However, I agree with the authors that the most interesting 
results are reported in table 7.6. These are based on a subpartition of  the one- 
book firms that produces a more powerful test of the authors’ economic intu- 
ition. Firms are partitioned into (1) “pure” one-book firms that report in accor- 
dance with domestic accounting standards and are not fully consolidated and 
(2) not-so-pure one-book firms that voluntarily issue supplementary reports 
that conform to U.S. GAAP, presumably because they are accessing global 
capital markets. These latter firms do not incur revelation signaling costs be- 
cause their U.S. GAAP numbers already reveal their profitability. The authors 
find that the signaling costs are significant and that the model is not rejected 
for the pure one-book firms. This is a nice result, and more generally, this paper 
is excellent research. 
My only negative comment is that there are some disconnections between 
the appendices and the exposition in the main text. In particular, the authors 
could have explained more clearly how the various accounting procedures doc- 
umented by country in the appendices affect the estimation of the model and 
the interpretation of  the results. For example, they could have  distinguished 
the accounting procedures that affect the variable’s measurement errors from 
those that affect the accuracy of  the sample partition. Aside from these minor 
concerns with the exposition, I think that this is superb work that demonstrates 
the gains that can be achieved when accountants and economists collaborate. This Page Intentionally Left Blank